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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SEITZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
Dr. Eliot Menkowitz ("appellant") appeals the order of the 
district court granting defendants' Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss claims brought under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. SS 12101-12213 (1994) ("the 
ADA"), and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 
U.S.C. S 794 (1994) ("the Rehabilitation Act"). In contesting 
the district court's interpretation of the ADA, appellant 
raises an issue of first impression in our court-- namely, 
whether Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. SS 12181-12189 
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("Title III"), prohibits disability discrimination against a 
medical doctor with "staff privileges" at a hospital. 
Appellant also disputes the district court's causation 
analysis under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The 
district court exercised subject matter jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. S 1331 (1994). Our jurisdiction to consider 
these issues arises under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 (1994). We will 
review a dismissal for failure to state a claim, and in 
particular the legal interpretation of the federal statutes at 
issue, under a plenary standard. Lake v. Arnold, 112 F.3d 
682, 684 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
I. Facts 
 
Because this appeal comes to us from an order granting 
defendants' motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6), we take as established the relevant facts alleged in 
the appellant's complaint. Appellant is an orthopedic 
surgeon who, in 1973, joined the Pottstown Memorial 
Medical Center ("PMMC" or "the hospital"), which is a 
private, non-profit, community hospital. He alleges that he 
holds an appointment to the medical staff at PMMC, which 
is defined as "[a]ny duly licensed physician, dentist or 
podiatrist who has been appointed to membership by the 
Board and is privileged to attend patients or to provide 
other diagnostic, therapeutic, teaching or research services 
at the Hospital." Medical Staff By-Laws of PMMC, App. at 
189. 
 
The complaint further alleges that upon being diagnosed 
for attention-deficit disorder in July of 1995, appellant 
provided the hospital with a written report from his clinical 
psychologist and treating physician stating that the 
disorder would not affect his ability to treat patients or 
properly interact with the hospital staff. Subsequently, the 
hospital accused appellant of various infractions of hospital 
policies -- accusations which the appellant considered "a 
pattern of harassment and intimidation." Pl.'s Compl. P 26, 
App. at 14. On March 18, 1997, the hospital summarily 
suspended appellant's medical staff privileges without 
notice or a hearing in alleged violation of the hospital's own 
by-laws. The Medical Committee of the Board of Directors 
later heard testimony from various staff members, not 
 
                                3 
  
including the appellant, and ultimately approved the 
decision to suspend staff privileges for a six month period. 
The hospital also reported the suspension to the National 
Practitioner Data Bank for Adverse Information on 
Physicians and Other Health Care Practitioners, which 
would result in deleterious consequences to the appellant's 
insurance coverage and professional reputation. 
 
As a result of these alleged events, appellant instituted 
this action under Title III of the ADA, alleging that PMMC 
discriminated against him on the basis of his disability by 
denying him the opportunity to participate in the medical 
staff privileges offered by the hospital. He also alleged a 
violation of the Rehabilitation Act through the hospital's 
interference with patient relationships solely by reason of 
his disability. The district court, in considering the ADA 
claim, relied on the "normal usage" of the phrase "public 
accommodation," and the statutory limitation in 42 U.S.C. 
S 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv), to conclude that Title III addresses 
discrimination only against individuals who patronize 
places that accommodate the public -- such as patients, 
customers, guests, and so forth. In the context of health 
care providers, the district court surmised that Title III 
protects only "those persons seeking medical care, and not 
the employees and other staff who serve them." Because 
the appellant in this case was not a person seeking medical 
care, the district court dismissed the ADA claim. With 
respect to the section 504 Rehabilitation Act claim, the 
district court held that the appellant failed to allege facts 
showing that the hospital had suspended staff privileges 
"solely by reason of . . . his alleged disability," and 
dismissed that claim as well. We turn to these issues 
seriatim.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Appellant, joined by his wife Susan Menkowitz, has also asserted a 
number of supplemental state law claims, which the district court 
declined to entertain once it dismissed the federal actions. See 28 U.S.C. 
S 1367(c) (1994). That determination will be vacated in our mandate. See 
Conclusions, infra. 
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II. The ADA 
 
A. Plain Language of Title III 
 
The question of whether Title III grants a cause of action 
to a doctor with hospital staff privileges is one of statutory 
construction and, as such, we begin with the language of 
the statute. Title III states as a "general rule": 
 
        No individual shall be discriminated against on the 
       basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of 
       the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
       accommodations of any place of public accommodation 
       by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or 
       operates a place of public accommodation. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 12182(a). The statute does not define the term 
"individual" for purposes of this subchapter, nor does it 
define the phrase "goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations." However, a "place of 
public accommodation" is defined in 42 U.S.C. S 12181(7) 
and specifically includes a hospital, provided it affects 
interstate commerce. 42 U.S.C. S 12181(7)(F). No party on 
appeal challenges the hospital's status as a place of public 
accommodation within the meaning of the ADA. The same 
is true of the hospital's effect on interstate commerce. 
 
The term "discrimination" is not directly and uniformly 
defined in Title III. Instead, the statute provides several 
"general prohibitions" that constitute discrimination for 
purposes of the general rule found in 42 U.S.C.S 12182(a). 
See 42 U.S.C. SS 12182(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii). They include, for 
example, the "denial of participation" in which it is recited: 
 
        It shall be discriminatory to subject an individual or 
       class of individuals on the basis of a disability or 
       disabilities of such individual or class, directly, or 
       through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements, 
       to a denial of the opportunity of the individual or class 
       to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, 
       facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of 
       an entity. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 12182(b)(1)(A)(i). The statute also defines as 
discrimination, and hence conduct prohibited under the 
 
                                5 
  
general rule, the "participation in unequal benefit," 42 
U.S.C. S 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii), and "separate benefit," 42 U.S.C. 
S 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii). It is noteworthy that these defining 
subparagraphs contain a limitation as set forth in 42 
U.S.C. S 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv): "For purposes of clauses (i) 
through (iii) of this subparagraph, the term `individual or 
class of individuals' refers to the clients or customers of the 
covered public accommodation that enters into the 
contractual, licensing or other arrangement." 
 
In addition to these delineations of discriminatory 
practices, Title III sets forth another set of "specific 
prohibitions" that define the term discrimination for 
purposes of the general rule announced in 42 U.S.C. 
S 12182(a). See 42 U.S.C. S 12182(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iv). Among 
these is: 
 
       [A] failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, 
       practices, or procedures, when such modifications are 
       necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, 
       privileges, advantages, or accommodations to 
       individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can 
       demonstrate that making such modifications would 
       fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, 
       facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations. 
 
42 U.S.C. S 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). Unlike the "general 
prohibition" demarcations of discriminatory practice set out 
in 42 U.S.C. S 12182(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii), these definitions of 
discrimination contain no language limiting the scope of the 
phrase "individual or class of individuals" as is found in 42 
U.S.C. S 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv). 
 
B. The Arguments on Appeal 
 
Appellant vigorously attacks the district court's 
conclusion that Title III proscribes discrimination only 
against members of the hospital's "public," who consist of 
persons seeking medical care and not hospital staff 
members. Appellant bases his position on two grounds. 
First, under a plain meaning approach, appellant contends 
that the general rule found in 42 U.S.C. S 12182(a) literally 
applies to any "individual" and contains no restriction that 
would limit the scope of protected persons only to those 
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who patronize places that accommodate the public. 
Because a "privilege" offered by a hospital is staff 
membership to medical personnel, appellant maintains that 
he has a cause of action under Title III to the extent he was 
an "individual" who was denied the "full and equal 
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations of" the hospital. Second, 
appellant argues that a broad interpretation of those 
individuals affording Title III protection is consistent with 
the overall statutory scheme of the ADA and its legislative 
history. 
 
The hospital disputes the appellant's analysis. It argues 
that Title III cannot be read to include any "individual" 
denied a privilege offered by a place of public 
accommodation. This reading, the hospital posits, would 
render Title I of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. SS 12111-12117 ("Title 
I"), which relates to employment discrimination, a nullity 
and would accordingly violate Congressional intent. Thus, 
the hospital concludes that "individuals" for purposes of 
Title III are limited only to those persons who are 
"customers or clients" that patronize the place of public 
accommodation. In the hospital's view, because appellant 
had a unique business relationship with the hospital he 
cannot sue as the member of the public protected by Title 
III. 
 
C. Are Medical Staff Members "individuals" Protected 
       by Title III When they Are Denied the "full and 
       equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
       privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any 
       place of public accommodation"? 
 
Given the language of the statute and the parties' 
arguments, we now turn to the issue directly posed in this 
appeal -- may a medical doctor with staff privileges 
properly assert a cause of action under Title III? It is not 
argued on appeal that the appellant failed to allege that the 
hospital's conduct would be discriminatory within the 
meaning of the ADA. Appellant has, in addition, alleged 
that the discrimination occurred on the basis of a disability 
as understood under the Act. Also, the parties do not 
dispute on appeal that appellant is "disabled" as that term 
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is defined in the ADA.2 Hence, the only remaining issue is 
whether the appellant is an "individual" who was denied the 
"full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of [the] place of 
public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. S 12182(a). 
 
While the ADA does not define the terms "individual" or 
"goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations," we would ordinarily seek to construe 
these words under their ordinary, plain meaning without a 
more involved inquiry into legislative history, congressional 
intent, or otherwise. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. 
Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 81 (1995); Ford v. Schering- 
Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 613 (3d Cir. 1998). Reading the 
language of the statute, however, immediately raises several 
problems in its construction. First, it is not abundantly 
clear whether an "individual" protected by the general rule 
in Title III refers only to "clients or customers of the covered 
public accommodation," as contained in 42 U.S.C. 
S 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv). Although the term "clients or 
customers" does not directly apply to the general rule itself, 
the district court surmised from this phrase that Title III 
protects "members of the public -- actual and would be 
guests, customers, and clients -- who seek the`full and 
equal enjoyment' of the services, facilities, or other 
accommodations of places that serve the public." 
 
Perhaps more importantly, the term individual in Title III, 
if read broadly, may encroach upon the scope of Title I, 
which grants a cause of action not to an "individual" but to 
a "qualified individual with a disability." 42 U.S.C. 
S 12112(a). Title I explicitly defines the phrase "qualified 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The hospital in its brief to this court invites us to affirm the 
district 
court's dismissal of appellant's Title III claim on the ground that he is 
not disabled within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. S 12102(2). Although we 
may affirm the district court on any ground raised before it, see Neely v. 
Zimmerman, 858 F.2d 144, 149 (3d Cir. 1988), we decline to accept the 
hospital's invitation at this stage of the litigation. Appellant in his 
complaint states that his disability is "a disorder recognized as a 
disability under the" ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Pl.'s Compl. P 8, 
App. at 11. We find this allegation, which we must accept as true, 
sufficient to meet the notice pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 
with respect to his disability. 
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individual with a disability," see 42 U.S.C. S 12111(8), and 
federal courts have long since explored and construed its 
meaning. Nevertheless, it is by now well established that 
"[h]owever inclusive may be the general language of a 
statute, it `will not be held to apply to a matter specifically 
dealt with in another part of the same enactment.' " Fourco 
Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228 
(1957) (citations omitted). This canon of construction 
carries particular force where, as here, Congress has 
enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme and has 
"deliberately targeted specific problems with specific 
solutions." Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 519 (1996) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting); HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 
450 U.S. 1, 6 (1981) (per curiam). Hence, we face a 
statutory puzzle; because of the potentially expansive 
nature of the term "individual," and ultimately the scope of 
Title III protection, we run the risk of rendering 
meaningless in many cases the differences between Title I 
and Title III. This would include, for example, significant 
disparities in coverage, remedies, and construction. As a 
result, we are compelled to explore the ADA's legislative 
history in order to fully understand the scope and meaning 
of Title III as applied to this case. 
 
1. Legislative History and Congressional Intent 
 
Among the broadly stated purposes of the ADA, see 42 
U.S.C. S 12101(b), is the intent to "invoke the sweep of 
congressional authority . . . in order to address the major 
areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with 
disabilities." Id. S 12101(b)(4). This comes after a specific 
finding by Congress that discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities persist in many critical areas, including 
"health services." 42 U.S.C. S 12101(a)(3). Indeed, there is 
little doubt that Congress intended the ADA as a 
comprehensive remedial statute with broad ramifications. 
See 42 U.S.C. S 12101(b)(1); Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 
128 F.3d 408, 414 (6th Cir. 1997). 
 
Navigating the sea of the ADA's legislative history and 
supporting documentation is a considerable task, but 
several important beacons emerge as to what Congress 
intended to cover under Title III as opposed to Title I of the 
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ADA. First, it is evident that Congress sought to regulate 
disability discrimination in the area of employment 
exclusively through Title I, notwithstanding the broad 
language of Title III. As the Senate report makes clear, "Title 
III is not intended to govern any terms or conditions of 
employment by providers of public accommodations or 
potential places of employment; employment practices are 
governed by [T]itle I of this legislation." S. Rep. No. 101- 
116, at 58 (1989). See also Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 
145 F.3d 601, 612 (3d Cir. 1998); Parker v. Metropolitan 
Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1014 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc); 
Motzkin v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 938 F. Supp. 983, 996 
(D. Mass. 1996). Similarly, the House Report states that 
Title I "sets forth prohibitions against discrimination on the 
basis of disability by employers, employment agencies, 
labor organizations, or joint labor-management committees 
. . . with respect to hiring and all terms, conditions, and 
privileges of employment." H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 
54 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 336; see 
also id. at 99, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 382. 
Accordingly, it is apparent that Congress did not intend 
Title III -- despite the breadth of its language-- to govern 
discrimination within the employment setting and we 
cannot construe Title III in a manner that would eviscerate 
such a salient legislative mandate. 
 
Our conclusion is reinforced by Congress' 1992 
amendment of the Rehabilitation Act, providing that"[t]he 
standards used to determine whether [section 504] has 
been violated in a complaint alleging employment 
discrimination under this section shall be the standards 
applied under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
of 1990." 29 U.S.C. S 794(d). The Senate Report explains 
that this and similar provisions, see 29 U.S.C. S 793(d), 
were intended to "ensure uniformity and consistency of 
interpretations." S. Rep. No. 102-357, at 71 (1992), 
reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3712, 3782. 
 
Apart from the potential intersection between Title I and 
Title III, the legislative history sheds little light on the 
intended meaning of an "individual" who is denied the "full 
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations" of a place of 
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public accommodation as those words are used in 42 
U.S.C. S 12182(a). What is clear, however, is that the 
legislative use of the phrase "customers or clients of the 
covered public accommodation that enters into a 
contractual arrangement" was not intended to restrict the 
general class of persons entitled to sue under Title III, 
contrary to the district court's conclusion. The House 
Report observes that in restricting the term individuals to 
"clients or customers of the covered public 
accommodation," the intent was to ensure that"a public 
accommodation's obligations are not extended or changed 
in any manner by virtue of its lease with another entity." 
H.R. Rep. 101-485, pt. 2., at 104 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 384. To illustrate, the report states: 
 
       [A] store located in an inaccessible mall or other 
       building, which is operated by another entity, is not 
       liable for the failure of that other entity to comply with 
       this Act by virtue of having a lease or other contract 
       with that entity. This is because, as noted, the store's 
       legal obligations extends only to individuals in their 
       status as its own clients or customers, not in their 
       status as the clients or customers of other public 
       accommodations. Likewise, of course, a covered entity 
       may not use a contractual provision to reduce any of 
       its obligations under this Act. 
 
Id. Thus, Congress intended the phrase "customers or 
clients of the covered public accommodation that enters into 
a contractual, licensing or other arrangement," 42 U.S.C. 
S 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv) (emphasis added), to encompass the 
relatively narrower situation where several entities enter 
into a contractual or other relationship. See H.R. Rep. 101- 
485, pt. 2., at 101 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
303, 384 ("The section has never been intended to 
encompass the clients or customers of other entities.") 
(emphasis in original). It is therefore not surprising that the 
term "clients or customers" does not appear in Title III or 
its legislative history other than in reference to contractual 
or other arrangements. Indeed, the "clients or customers" 
limitation set forth in 42 U.S.C. S 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv) does not 
directly apply to the general rule established in section 
12182(b) but instead covers the instances of 
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"discrimination" described in sections 12182(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii), 
all of which encompass "contractual, licensing, or other 
arrangement." 
 
Finally, the legislative history to the ADA demonstrates 
that in enacting Title III, Congress intended to extend the 
scope of protection afforded to those individuals under the 
Rehabilitation Act. The House Report, for example, states 
that "Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits 
Federal agencies and recipients of Federal financial 
assistance from discriminating against persons with 
disabilities. The purpose of [T]itle III . . . is to extend these 
general prohibitions against discrimination to privately 
operated public accommodations and to bring individuals 
with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of 
American life." H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 99 (1990), 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 381-82. Much of the 
remaining legislative history echoes this intention. See 
generally 1 Henry H. Perritt, Americans with Disabilities Act 
Handbook S 1.2, at 4 (1997) (collecting examples). The ADA 
itself states that "[N]othing in this chapter shall be 
construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards 
applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973." 42 
U.S.C. S 12201(a). Courts, including our own, have 
accordingly examined Rehabilitation Act precedent in 
examining the scope of coverage under the ADA. See 
Yeskey v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Dep't of 
Corrections, 118 F.3d 168, 170 (3d Cir. 1997), aff'd, 118 
S. Ct. 1952 (1998); 1 Perritt, supra, S 1.2, at 4. 
 
2. Case Law 
 
With these principles in mind, we turn to the question of 
whether the appellant is an "individual" who is denied the 
"full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations" of a place of 
public accommodation as those terms are used in Title III. 
We do not write on a blank slate and it is appropriate at 
this juncture to examine precedent interpreting this phrase 
within the framework of Title III's language. 
 
In Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 
1998), this court considered whether a disparity between 
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disability benefits for mental and physical disabilities 
violated Title III of the ADA. Id. at 612-14. The plaintiff in 
that case argued that insurance benefits offered by her 
employer, and indirectly its insurance carrier, contained 
unequal disability benefits and therefore denied her the 
equal enjoyment of a "service" or "privilege" offered by a 
place of public accommodation. Our analysis of that 
contention led us to reach two important conclusions 
relevant to this appeal. First, relying on the ADA's 
legislative history, we dismissed the plaintiff 's claim under 
Title III against her employer because Title I, and not Title 
III, governed the "terms and conditions of employment by 
providers of public accommodations." Id. at 612 (quoting S. 
Rep. No. 101-116, at 58 (1989)). Before even reaching the 
interpretation of the words "service" or "privilege" under 
Title III, we noted that insurance benefits were offered in 
the context of her employment and therefore the terms of 
Title I exclusively governed her action against her employer. 
 
With respect to the plaintiff's claim in Ford against her 
insurance carrier, this court concluded that while 
insurance benefits may be ordinarily considered a type of 
"service," "privilege," or "advantage," they are not services of 
the place of public accommodation. Id. We reasoned that 
under the plain meaning of Title III, a public 
accommodation is a physical place and therefore the phrase 
"goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations" refer to "what these places of public 
accommodation provide." Id. at 613. In aligning ourselves 
with the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, see Parker 
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(en banc), we required at the very least some "nexus" 
between the physical place of public accommodation and 
the services denied in a discriminatory manner. Ford, 145 
F.3d at 613; see also Parker, 121 F.3d at 1011 (looking to 
a "nexus between the disparity in benefits and the services 
which [the defendant] offers to the public from its 
insurance office"); but see Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. 
Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, Inc., 37 
F.3d 12, 19-20 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that Title III is not 
limited to physical structures). Because the disparate 
insurance benefits offered by an insurance office do not 
relate to the insurance office itself -- that is, the physical 
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place of public accommodation -- the plaintiff in Ford could 
not state a cause of action under Title III of the ADA. 
 
3. Analysis 
 
Under the language of Title III, its legislative history, and 
the principles announced in Ford, we must conclude that 
the appellant has properly stated a cause of action as an 
"individual" discriminated against in the "full and equal 
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation." At the outset, we cannot accept the 
district court's blanket interpretation that Congress 
intended Title III to apply only to members of the "public," 
which the district court defined as those guests, clients, or 
customers who seek the services, facilities, or privileges 
offered by a place of public accommodation. The operative 
rule announced in Title III speaks not in terms of "guests," 
"patrons," "clients," "customers," or "members of the 
public," but instead broadly uses the word "individuals." 
Looking to the term "public accommodation," a term of art 
defined in 42 U.S.C. S 12181(7), does not aid the inquiry 
either because that phrase does not define the rights 
protected under the ADA and there can be no question that 
an operator of a hospital falls under the prohibitions 
associated with Title III. Similarly, the district court's 
reliance on the term "clients or customers" is equally 
misplaced. As both the language of Title III and its 
legislative history clearly demonstrate, the phrase "clients 
or customers," which only appears in 42 U.S.C. 
S 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv), is not a general circumscription of Title 
III and cannot serve to limit the broad rule announced in 
42 U.S.C. S 12182(a). 
 
Equally unavailing is the hospital's argument that 
illustrations cited by the ADA's legislative history all 
describe instances of members of the public as clients or 
customers. That a statute can be "applied in situations not 
expressly anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate 
ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. 
Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (citation omitted); see 
also Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S. Ct. 
1952, 1955 (1998). Nor can we agree with the hospital's 
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argument that Title III offers no protection against disability 
discrimination by virtue of the appellant's "unique business 
relationship" with the hospital. This contention runs 
contrary to the plain language and legislative history of 
Title III which in no way mentions any sort of "business 
relationship" that would preclude an "individual" from 
asserting a cause of action if denied the "full and equal 
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation." 
 
Similarly unpersuasive is the hospital's attempt to read 
significance into the absence of the phrase "qualified 
individual" from Title III, which appears in Title I, Title II, 
and the Rehabilitation Act. While the hospital argues that 
the absence of such a phrase indicates that Title III was 
never meant to apply in the "workplace," wefind no support 
for such a contention in the broadly drafted language of 
Title III itself, which prohibits "operators of a public 
accommodation" from discriminating against "individuals." 
Moreover, as stated by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit, the absence of the "qualified 
individual" language from Title III would make little 
difference in a case, such as this, where the plaintiff seeks 
reasonable accommodation: 
 
       We find little difference in this distinction, because 
       many of the issues that arise in the "qualified" 
       analysis, also arise in the context of the "reasonable 
       modifications" or "undue burden" analysis. That is, if 
       more than reasonable modifications are required of an 
       institution in order to accommodate an individual, then 
       that individual is not qualified for the program. 
 
Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 154 (1st Cir. 
1998). Thus, because the appellant in this case alleges that 
the hospital failed to "accommodate" his disability, see Pl.'s 
Compl. P 46(a), App. at 18, the hospital is free to show that 
the relief requested would "fundamentally alter the nature 
of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations." See 42 U.S.C. S 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
Similarly, in no way would a hospital be forced to 
accommodate an unqualified physician if he "poses a direct 
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threat to the health and safety of others." 42 U.S.C. 
S 12182(b)(3). 
 
We do agree with the hospital, however, that Title III was 
not intended to govern disability discrimination in the 
context of employment. See Ford, 145 F.3d at 612; S. Rep. 
No. 101-116, at 58 (1990). But the appellant in this case 
never alleged that he is an employee of the hospital or that 
he was denied the benefits associated with employment. 
The appellant's complaint instead alleges that he was 
"appointed to the Medical Staff of PMMC," App. at 8, and 
both parties maintain that his relationship with the 
hospital is not strictly one of employment but more in the 
nature of an independent contractor. See Pl.'s Br. at 23; 
Mem. in Support of Def.'s Motion to Dismiss Compl. at 9 n. 
4. Federal courts, including our own, have commented on 
the indicia of employment for purposes of the disability 
discrimination laws, see, e.g., EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 
F.2d 32, 36-38 (3d Cir. 1983) (considering the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act); Birchem v. Knights of 
Columbus, 116 F.3d 310, 312 (8th Cir. 1997) (considering 
Title I of the ADA); Cilecek v. Inova Health System Services, 
115 F.3d 256, 260-61 (4th Cir. 1997) (considering Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act); Alexander v. Rush North Shore 
Medical Center, 101 F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 1996) (same), 
and the analysis typically focuses in a myriad of fact- 
intensive considerations. The By-Laws of the hospital 
governing staff membership speak of staff "privileges" and 
"prerogatives," and do not themselves characterize the 
relationship between a medical staff member and the 
hospital as one of employment. The definition set forth in 
the By-Laws of a member of the medical staff is "[a]ny duly 
licensed physician, dentist or podiatrist who has been 
appointed to membership by the Board and is privileged to 
attend patients or to provide other diagnostic, therapeutic, 
teaching or research services at the Hospital." App. at 189. 
However, we cannot say more at this stage of the litigation 
because we must accept as true the facts as alleged in the 
appellant's complaint and any reasonable reading of the 
pleadings. See Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 
193 (3d Cir. 1993). It is quite clear in this case, as both the 
hospital and the district court have stated, that the 
appellant proceeded on the basis that he was not an 
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employee of the hospital and therefore not within the 
province of Title I. 
 
Assuming that the appellant is not an employee of the 
hospital as that term is understood under Title I, the only 
remaining question is whether he was denied the "full and 
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation." We look for, as we did in Ford, some 
nexus between the services or privileges denied and the 
physical place of the hospital as a public accommodation. 
Ford, 145 F.3d at 613. There can be little doubt that the 
appellant fulfills such a requirement in this case. Because 
of the appellant's suspension from the active medical staff, 
he can no longer enjoy the hospital's physical facilities in 
providing the necessary medical and consulting services to 
his patients. See By-Laws P 8.3(b)(i), App. at 135. Hence, 
the hospital denied the appellant the requisite physical 
access that we found lacking in Ford. This case is quite 
unlike a disparity in insurance benefits which had nothing 
to do with the facilities of an insurance office, or the "place" 
of public accommodation. Here, we cannot imagine a 
greater nexus between the privileges, advantages, or 
services denied and physical access to hospital facilities 
simply because of the nature of medical staff privileges -- 
privileges that lie at the very core of a hospital's facilities. 
 
We therefore hold that a medical doctor with staff 
privileges -- one who is not an employee for purposes of 
Title I -- may assert a cause of action under Title III of the 
ADA as an "individual" who is denied the "full and equal 
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation." Our conclusion is reinforced by several 
observations. First, we may effectively find no recourse 
under the ADA for the appellant if we were to hold that the 
he has no cause of action under Title III. That is, the 
appellant may not be a "qualified individual" under Title I 
because there was no employment relationship with a 
covered entity, and the appellant would not be protected 
under Title III because he is not an "individual" who is 
denied the "full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any 
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place of public accommodation." We cannot see how 
Congress intended such a result given the ADA's 
remarkable breadth of language and purpose -- especially 
when Congress expressly states that it seeks to 
comprehensively regulate "discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities in such critical areas as . . . 
health services." 42 U.S.C. S 12101(a)(3). Second, nothing 
in the Rehabilitation Act would prevent a physician with 
staff privileges from asserting a cause of action based on 
disability discrimination. See Landefeld v. Marion General 
Hospital, 994 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1993). Notfinding a 
similar cause of action under the ADA would lead to the 
perverse result that the ADA affords less protection than 
the Rehabilitation Act to a discrete class of disabled 
individuals. This squarely contradicts the language and 
intent of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. S 12201(a). Finally, the 
administrative guidance issued by the Justice Department 
interprets Title III to allow a cause of action for physicians 
with staff privileges. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Rights 
Division, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Title III 
Technical Assistance Manual P 4.1100, illus. 4 (Nov. 1993). 
As the agency charged by Congress to issue implementing 
regulations, the Department's views are entitled to 
deference. Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2199 (1998). 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the district court's order 
dismissing appellant's disability discrimination claim 
brought under Title III of the ADA. 
 
III. The Rehabilitation Act 
 
In addition to appellant's ADA claim, the complaint sets 
forth a cause of action under section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. S 794, which the district court 
dismissed because, in its view, appellant failed to allege 
that the hospital suspended staff privileges solely because 
of his disability. Appellant argues that the complaint 
sufficiently alleges facts that would permit the fact-finder to 
infer discrimination solely on the basis of his disability. We 
now turn to the sufficiency of the complaint. 
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A. Elements of a Section 504 Rehabilitation 
Action Claim 
 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act states, in relevant 
part: 
 
        No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in 
       the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or 
       his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be 
       denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
       discrimination under any program or activity receiving 
       Federal financial assistance or under any program or 
       activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the 
       United States Postal Service. 
 
29 U.S.C. S 794(a). We have held that in order to establish 
a violation under this section, the plaintiff must prove: 
 
       (1) that he is a "handicapped individual" under the Act, 
       (2) that he is "otherwise qualified" for the position 
       sought, (3) that he was excluded from the position 
       sought "solely by reason of his handicap," and (4) that 
       the program or activity in question receives federal 
       financial assistance. 
 
Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d 
Cir. 1983); see also Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Ctr., 49 
F.3d 1002, 1009 (3d Cir. 1995). As the Supreme Court has 
previously stated, the Rehabilitation Act does not impose an 
affirmative action obligation on recipients of federal 
assistance. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 
442 U.S. 397, 410-14 (1979). Instead, the Act is cast in 
negative terms and prohibits discriminatory action when an 
otherwise qualified individual is excluded from a position 
sought solely by reason of his handicap. See Jeremy H. v. 
Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 1996). 
The parties do not dispute at this stage of the litigation that 
appellant has sufficiently alleged he is a "handicapped 
individual," he is "otherwise qualified," and the hospital 
receives federal financial assistance.3  The only remaining 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The hospital once again asks this court to affirm the dismissal of 
appellant's Rehabilitation Act claim on the ground that he is not a 
"handicapped individual." For reasons stated above, see supra note 2, we 
decline this alternative ground for affirmance. 
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issue, therefore, is whether appellant has properly alleged 
he was excluded from the position sought "solely by reason 
of . . . his disability." 29 U.S.C. S 794(a). 
 
Many courts, including our own, have opined as to the 
meaning of the causation requirement embodied in the 
phrase "solely by reason of " an individual's disability. The 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, held that the 
"solely by reason of " language was "designed to weed out 
section 504 claims where an employer can point to conduct 
or circumstances that are causally unrelated to the 
plaintiff 's handicap." Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 
951 F.2d 511, 515 (2d Cir. 1991). We have previously 
stated that a plaintiff stating a claim under section 504 
need not allege an intent to discriminate on the part of the 
employer. See W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 492 (3d Cir. 
1995). Where the complaint alleges intentional 
discriminatory conduct, a plaintiff may make a prima facie 
case of causation if he was denied a benefit for which he 
was qualified "and was rejected under circumstances 
indicating discrimination on the basis of an impermissible 
factor." Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1340 (9th Cir. 
1990) (quoting Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 766 
(2d Cir. 1981); see also Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 
662 F.2d 292, 305 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 
B. The Appellant's Complaint 
 
As the hospital correctly points out, the appellant did not 
explicitly allege in his complaint that the suspension of 
staff privileges occurred "solely by reason of " his disability. 
However, certain factual allegations contained in the 
complaint would no doubt permit an inference of 
discrimination solely on the basis of appellant's known 
disability because of the timing and circumstances of his 
suspension. For example, appellant alleges in his complaint 
that after he informed the hospital of his disability, 
"defendant PMMC . . . engaged in a pattern of harassment 
and intimidation of plaintiff, unfairly and disparately 
accusing him of minor infractions of hospital policies." Pl.'s 
Compl. PP 26, 46(b), App. at 17, 18. The complaint further 
alleges that less than a year later, the hospital suspended 
appellant's medical staff privileges without a hearing and 
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with full knowledge of his disability. Id. PP 27-28, App. at 
15. On the other hand, the complaint, at times, would allow 
a contrary inference that the hospital suspended 
appellant's staff privileges because of various whistle 
blowing activities. Id. P 21, App. at 13-14 ("[B]ased on 
dissatisfaction with plaintiff 's repeated articulated concerns 
regarding omissions in medical care at PMMC, defendant[ ] 
PMMC . . . accused plaintiff of allegedly inappropriate 
behavior unrelated to the quality of patient care rendered 
by plaintiff."). Yet, that inference is undermined by the fact 
that Menkowitz had criticized hospital practices for over 
twenty years without suffering adverse consequences. Id. 
P 20, App. at 13. 
 
Based on this recitation of the facts, which we must 
accept as true at this stage of the litigation, it is evident 
that appellant has sufficiently alleged causation as required 
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. It is, of course, 
firmly established that in reviewing a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 
motion, we must draw all reasonable inferences in the 
plaintiff 's favor. See Schrob v. Catterson, 948 F.2d 1402, 
1405 (3d Cir. 1991). Just as a pleading must "be construed 
as to do substantial justice," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f), see also 
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957), a plaintiff 
generally need not explicitly allege the existence of every 
element in a cause of action if fair notice of the transaction 
is given and the complaint sets forth the material points 
necessary to sustain recovery. See 5 Charles Alan Wright & 
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure S 1216, at 
154-162 (2d ed. 1990). This is especially so if the material 
deficiencies in the complaint stem from nothing more than 
inartful pleading -- the precise sort of pleading as a highly 
developed form of art that the federal rules sought to 
abandon. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 48. Simply put, the 
complaint will withstand a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) attack if 
the material facts as alleged, in addition to inferences 
drawn from those allegations, provide a basis for recovery. 
 
In this case, the appellant has set forth sufficient factual 
circumstances to permit an inference to be drawn that the 
hospital suspended medical staff privileges solely by reason 
of his handicap as prohibited under section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act. The hospital was fully aware of the 
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appellant's disability and, nearly a year later, suspended 
staff privileges without notice or explanation. In the interim, 
the hospital is alleged to have engaged in a "pattern of 
harassment and intimidation, unfairly and disparately 
accusing" appellant of hospital policy infractions. These 
facts give us pause and would no doubt create, at the very 
least, an inference which must be drawn in the appellant's 
favor -- specifically, that the hospital suspended staff 
privileges solely based on the appellant's known disability. 
Although it is true, as the hospital points out, certain 
inferences may be drawn against the appellant -- for 
example, that it was the appellant's raising "concerns 
regarding quality of care assurance issues" which provided 
the basis for suspension -- contrary inferences alone will 
not justify a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See 
Fuentes v. South Hills Cardiology, 946 F.2d 196, 202 (3d 
Cir. 1991). We have instead inquired whether the plaintiff 
will be able to prove any set of facts consistent with those 
allegations in the complaint that would sustain recovery. 
See Trump Hotel & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts, 
Inc., 140 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 1998). That the hospital 
suspended appellant's staff privileges solely on the basis of 
his disability is such a fact that may be proved and 
therefore the district court erred in dismissing the 
Rehabilitation Act claim on this ground. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the district court's order 
dismissing appellant's claim set forth under section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the order of the 
district court dismissing appellant's federal claims and 
remand for further appropriate proceedings. We will also 
vacate the order of the district court declining to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over appellant's state law claims, 
in light of our determination with respect to appellant's 
federal claims. 
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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part and concurring 
in part. 
 
Although the majority reaches a beneficial result, I am 
constrained to dissent because I find no support in either 
the statute or legislative history that Title III of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. SS 12101- 
12213 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998) (ADA), provides plaintiff 
a cause of action. Dr. Menkowitz, a physician with hospital 
staff privileges, did not bring suit under Title I of the ADA, 
which generally governs discrimination in the employment 
relationship. 
 
I agree with much of the majority's review of the relevant 
statutes. By its express terms, Title I of the ADA addresses 
the terms and conditions of employment and protects 
individuals from workplace discrimination.1 The definition 
of "qualified individual with a disability" demonstrates the 
exclusivity of Title I's role in prohibiting employment 
discrimination: "[it] means an individual with a disability 
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can 
perform the essential functions of the employment position 
that such individual holds or desires . . . . " 42 U.S.C.A. 
S 12111(8). In Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., ___ F.3d ___, 
No. 96-5674, 1998 WL 258386, at *12 (3d Cir. May 22, 
1998) (citations omitted), we stated explicitly: "[t]erms and 
conditions of employment are covered under Title I, not 
Title III. `Title III is not intended to govern any terms or 
conditions of employment by providers of public 
accommodations or potential places of employment; 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Title I provides, in part: 
 
       (a) General Rule 
 
        No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified 
individual 
       with a disability because of the disability of such individual in 
       regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or 
       discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and 
       other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 
 
42 U.S.C.A. S 12112(a) (West 1995). 
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employment practices are governed by [T]itle I of this 
legislation.' "2 
 
I do not believe Title III of the ADA is available to Dr. 
Menkowitz. Title III "specifically addresses discrimination by 
owners, lessors, and operators of public accommodations," 
Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1010 
(6th Cir. 1997),3 and protects members of the public. See 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. See also Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1014 (6th 
Cir. 1997) ("the statutory framework of the ADA expressly limits 
discrimination in employment practices of Title I of the ADA"); Leonard 
F v. Israel Discount Bank of New York, 967 F. Supp. 802, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997) ("Title III is not intended to govern any terms and conditions of 
employment by providers of public accommodations. Employment 
practices are governed by Title I") (citation omitted); Motzkin v. 
Trustees 
of Boston Univ., 938 F. Supp. 983, 995-96 (D. Mass. 1996) ("Title I . . . 
is entitled `Employment,' and, by its terms, it clearly applies to 
virtually 
all aspects of the employment relationship"). 
 
3. Title III provides, in part: 
 
       (a) General Rule 
 
        No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of 
       disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, 
       facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place 
of 
       public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases 
       to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 
 
42 U.S.C.A. S 12182(a) (West 1995). The discrimination generally 
prohibited is found in 42 U.S.C.A. S 12182(b): 
 
       (b) Construction 
 
        (1) General Prohibition 
 
        (A) Activities  
 
        (i) Denial of participation 
 
        It shall be discriminatory to subject an individual or class of 
       individuals on the basis of a disability or disabilities of such 
       individual or class, directly, or through contractual, licensing, 
or 
       other arrangements, to a denial of the opportunity of the 
individual 
       or class to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, 
       facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of an entity. 
 
* * * 
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42 U.S.C.A. S 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv) ("For purposes of clauses (i) 
through (iii) of this subparagraph, the term `individual or 
class of individuals' refers to the clients or customers of 
the covered public accommodation that enters into the 
contractual, licensing, or other arrangement") (emphasis 
supplied). 
 
Protecting recipients rather than providers, Title III 
ensures customers and clients access to the full enjoyment 
of goods and services free from disability based 
discrimination. The goods and services offered by the 
Pottstown Memorial Medical Center are health care and 
medical services. The "public" for purposes of Title III refers 
to those persons desiring medical care, not those seeking 
staff privileges. "Staff privileges" do not appear to constitute 
"privileges" as that term is articulated in Title III. The 
apparent privilege is access to medical care and health care 
facilities irrespective of disability, not the privilege of 
serving on the staff of the health care provider. See Motzkin, 
938 F. Supp. at 995-96 ("While it could be argued that the 
terms `privileges' and `advantages' [in Title III] in the 
abstract, are general enough to encompass employment 
opportunities, one does not ordinarily think of jobs as being 
among the `privileges' and `advantages' offered to members 
of the public by places of public accommodation"). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
        (2) Specific prohibitions 
 
        (A) Discrimination 
 
        For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, discrimination 
       includes (i) the imposition of application or eligibility criteria 
that 
       screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or 
a 
       class of individuals with disabilities from fully and equally 
enjoying 
       and goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
       accommodations unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary 
       for the provision of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
       advantages, or accommodations being offered. 
 
42 U.S.C.A. SS 12182(b)(1)(A)(i), (b)(2)(A)(i). See e.g., Parker, 121 F.3d 
at 
1010 ("Title III specifically prohibits, inter alia, the provision of 
unequal 
or separate benefits by a place of public accommodation") (citing 42 
U.S.C.A. SS 12182(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii)). 
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Moreover, the list of "public accommodations" in 42 
U.S.C.A. S 12818(7) suggests Title III covers only 
discrimination against guests, customers, and clients of 
places held open for service to the general public.4 See 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. 42 U.S.C.A. S 12181(7) includes, inter alia, 
 
       (A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging . . . . 
 
       (B) a restaurant, bar or other establishment serving food or drink; 
 
       (C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or 
other 
       place of exhibition or entertainment; 
 
       (D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place 
of 
       public gathering; 
 
       (E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, 
shopping 
       center, or other sales or rental establishment; 
 
       (F) a Laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, 
       travel service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, 
office 
       of an accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, 
professional 
       office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service 
       establishment; 
 
       (G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public 
       transportation; 
 
       (H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or 
       collection; 
 
       (I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation; 
 
       (J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or post 
       graduate private school, or other place of education; 
 
       (K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, 
food 
       bank, adoption agency, or other social service center 
establishment; 
       and 
 
       (L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other 
       place of exercise or recreation 
 
See Sharrow v. Bailey, 910 F. Supp. 187, 192 (M.D. Pa. 1995) ("The 
professional offices of health care providers are places of public 
accommodation for ADA purposes") (citations omitted). 
 
Recent jurisprudence reveals "public accommodation" is defined with 
some specificity. See Ford, 1998 WL 258386, at *12-13 (noting it is "all 
of the services which the public accommodation offers, not all services 
which the lessor of the public accommodations offers, which fall within 
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Ford, 1998 WL 258386 at *12 ("the `goods, services, 
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations' 
concerning which a disabled person cannot suffer 
discrimination are not free standing concepts but rather all 
refer to the statutory term `public accommodation' and thus 
to what these places of public accommodation provides"). 
As noted, the "services" and "privileges" provided by 
Pottstown Memorial Medical Center are medical services, 
not staff privileges, and thus Title III, on its face, would not 
apply to Dr. Menkowitz. 
 
When compared to other provisions of the ADA and the 
Rehabilitation Act prohibiting discrimination, the 
proscription imposed by Title III appears more narrowly 
drawn. Title II, addressing discrimination by public entities, 
broadly provides: 
 
        Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no 
       qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of 
       such disability, be excluded from participation in or be 
       denied the benefits of the services, programs, or 
       activities of a public entity, or be subjected to 
       discrimination by any such entity. 
 
42 U.S.C.A. S 12132 (West 1995). Similarly, the prohibition 
against discrimination mandated by the Rehabilitation Act 
broadly states, in part: 
 
       (a) Promulgation of rules and Regulations 
 
        No otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . 
       shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be 
       excluded from the participation in, be denied the 
       benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
       program or activity receiving Federal financial 
       assistance. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the scope of Title III . . . . Restricting `public accommodations' to 
places 
is in keeping with the jurisprudence concerning Title II of the Civil 
Rights 
Act of 1964"); Parker, 121 F.3d at 1014 (finding "[t]he clear connotation 
of the words in S 12181(7) is that a public accommodation is a physical 
place" and concluding "the provision of a long-term disability plan by an 
employer and administered by an insurance company does not fall 
within the purview of Title III"). 
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29 U.S.C.A. S 794(a) (West Supp. 1998). 
 
Dr. Menkowitz contends he is not an employee, but 
rather a physician with staff privileges. Yet, Dr. Menkowitz' 
allegations of discrimination center around the terms and 
conditions of his employment as a staff physician at 
Pottstown Memorial Medical Center, which fall generally 
within the ambit of Title I. Title I defines "discriminate" to 
include, inter alia, "participating in a contractual or other 
relationship that has the effect of subjecting a covered 
entity's qualified applicant or employee with a disability to 
the discrimination prohibited by this subchapter . .. . " 42 
U.S.C.A. S 12112(b)(2). Title I also prohibits discrimination 
in the dispensation of "privileges." 
 
But as the majority notes, the parties have characterized 
Dr. Menkowitz' relationship with the Pottstown Memorial 
Medical Center as "more in the nature of an independent 
contractor," raising the question whether he can state a 
claim under Title I. In Equal Employment Opportunity 
Comm'n v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1983), we 
articulated the appropriate standard to determine whether 
an individual constitutes an "employee" for purposes of the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.A.SS 621- 
34 (West 1985 & Supp. 1998) (ADEA). After noting 
independent contractors are not employees within the 
meaning of the ADEA, we concluded "the hybrid standard 
that combines the common law `right to control' with the 
`economic realities' as applied in Title VII cases is the 
correct standard for determining employee status under 
ADEA." Id. at 38.5 By analogy, a staff physician like Dr. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In reaching this conclusion, we compared the ADEA to Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. S 2000e-2000e-17 (West 1994 & 
Supp. 1998). The methods and manner of proof under the ADA mirror 
those applicable to Title VII and the ADEA. See Dykes v. DePuy, Inc., 140 
F.3d 31, 39 (1st Cir. 1998) ("Since, as a matter of law Dykes was an 
independent contractor, the district court properly granted summary 
judgment on Dykes's ERISA, ADA, and state antidiscrimination claims"); 
Birchem v. Knights of Columbus, 116 F.3d 310, 312 (8th Cir. 1997) ("Like 
Title VII, the ADA protects `employees' but not independent contractors") 
(citation omitted); Alexander v. Rush N. Shore Med. Ctr., 101 F.3d 487, 
492-93 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting "independent contractors are not 
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Menkowitz, whose duties may make him an independent 
contractor, may not qualify as an employee under the ADA. 
Irrespective, Title I more suitably addresses the context in 
which the complained conduct occurred. 
 
I concur with the majority's analysis with respect to Dr. 
Menkowitz' claim under the Rehabilitation Act. 
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_________________________________________________________________ 
 
protected by Title VII" and finding physician cannot bring a Title VII 
alleging the hospital's revocation of his staff privileges constituted 
unlawful discrimination absent proof of an employment relationship, 
which did not exist because physician was independent contractor); 
Newman v. GHS Osteopathic, Inc., Parkview Hosp. Div., 60 F.3d 153, 157 
(3d Cir. 1995) ("In the context of employment discrimination, the ADA, 
ADEA and Title VII all serve the same purpose - to prohibit 
discrimination in employment against members of certain classes. 
Therefore, it follows that the methods and manner of proof under one 
statute should inform the standards under the others as well"); Spirides 
v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (stating Title VII does 
not protect independent contractors). 
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